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Abstract 
This study combines established escalation of commitment theory with research specifically 
aimed at understanding the role of heuristics in the field of outdoor leadership in order to create 
an understanding of decision-making processes in this context. Current decision-making 
frameworks taught to outdoor leaders rely on these theories but has yet to undergo rigorous 
testing as to its effectiveness. This study gave current decision-making education to one group 
and a control education to another group and found no significant differences between the two 
when asked to respond to the same situation. This finding suggests that further research into 
decision-making frameworks in the outdoors is required to improve the overall education of 
outdoor leaders. 
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Escalation of Commitment and Heuristics in Outdoor Leadership:  
How Poor Education Can Impact Outdoor Leaders’ Decisions 
 Early in the morning of May 10, 1996, climbers arose shortly after midnight from their 
tents perched on Mt. Everest’s South Col, 7,900 meters, to make their final summit attempt on 
the mountain. All knowledge of weather and the experience of the teams’ leaders indicated that 
the day would end successfully. However, it was not long before the two teams started to 
encounter major delays. Miscommunications and altitude illnesses started costing the teams 
precious time. The teams had declared their turn-around time that morning (the point at which, 
no matter where they are, they will descend the mountain and head back to their shelter at 7,900 
meters). With the time they had lost early in the morning, that turn-around time was fast 
approaching, yet the teams kept pushing to the summit anyway (Krakauer, 1997).  
 The decision to remain committed to their goal potentially could have had few 
consequences if conditions on the mountain remained ideal. But unfortunately, a major storm, 
unforeseen by weather forecasts, engulfed the mountain and claimed the lives of eight climbers. 
But why would a group of experienced climbers, led by two highly regarded mountain guides, 
disobey one of the few steadfast rules of mountaineering: obey your turn-around time? This is an 
example of the escalation of commitment, and how that phenomenon can cost lives when it plays 
a role in the decision-making process of outdoor leaders.  
The Theory Behind the Escalation of Commitment 
 Escalation of commitment is the tendency of decision-makers to throw more and more 
resources at a failing course of action, hoping that will make it pay off (Staw, 1981; Staw & Fox, 
1977). In the 1996 Everest disaster, the team leaders thought just giving themselves a little more 
time would allow them and their teams to reach the summit. Although, in this case, many of 
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them did actually summit, they were also left exposed to the infamous storm that claimed eight 
lives (McMullen & Kier, 2016). So why is it that, instead, these individuals invested more, 
ultimately setting themselves up to be in the worst possible position when the storm hit? 
 Escalation of commitment is a well-studied phenomenon in the field of business and 
management, so we know a lot of the reasoning that drives those types of decisions. Outdoor 
leaders must often rely subjective information to make their decisions, without the time or ability 
to factor in objective indicators. This can leave them at the more susceptible end of the spectrum 
compared to leaders in other fields. 
Escalation of commitment can have dire consequences in the field of outdoor leadership. 
Though most research done on the topic in general is relevant to this specific field, there is very 
little research done in how to best mitigate escalation in the outdoor context. Understanding the 
theory, from both general and specialized researchers, provides valuable insight as to how the 
process of overcommitment can be interrupted in this context. 
Fundamentals of Escalation 
 Barry Staw (1981) presented a model based on a few factors that can contribute to 
escalating commitment. The first factor is retrospective rationality, or the information gleaned 
from past or the context. This could involve the outcomes of past decisions that are similar to 
present dilemma, the foreseeability of outcomes in the moment based on past experience, and 
especially the responsibility of the decision maker for the consequences at hand.  
 The second factor laid out by Staw is modeling. This takes into account the culture, 
norms, and expectations of the team. This involves how the decision maker defines success or 
failure, and what personal implications the individual will face for the outcome. How one defines 
success and failure is one of the critical factors of escalation.  
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 The final factor is prospective rationality and involves how well a decision-maker can 
estimate future outcomes. This is based on understanding the cause of the setback (if it is due to 
a fluke or if that setback will be something continually battled with) and how effective resources 
will be at combating that setback (often based on how effective they have been in the past).  
 Staw places a lot of weigh on the importance of personal responsibility into this model. 
His research suggests that the more responsibility for an outcome a decision maker has, the more 
likely they will be to overcommit resources in the face of failure. Staw believed this was the 
strongest predictor of escalation, and unfortunately, outdoor leaders assume sole responsibility 
for the safety of a group and the desired outcomes. With little to no contact with the outside 
world, such as their superiors or access to information, outcomes are based solely on the leader 
or leaders’ judgement. According to Staw, this already puts outdoor leaders on thin ice.  
 Staw has well-documented the role of personal responsibility in escalation, but recent 
studies suggest that there is more to the story. Joel Brockner (1992) incorporates the idea of loss 
aversion into the model of escalation. Loss aversion states that actors will go to great lengths and 
take great risk in order to avoid a loss. As established by Staw’s modeling (1981), how someone 
defines success and failure is crucial to how they will later make decisions regarding an outcome. 
Outdoor leaders are often hired to help a team accomplish an objective, and the achievement of 
that objective becomes the benchmark for success or failure. Brockner (1992) suggests that when 
the ability to achieve that goal is in jeopardy, outdoor leaders may take more risks, jeopardizing 
personal safety, in order to, hopefully, achieve that goal.  
 The role of hope is also a crucial, additional factor in escalation, as studied by Huang, 
Souitaris, and Barsade (2019). The authors studied the effects of both hope and fear when faced 
with uncertainty in a decision. They found that hope is much more salient than fear, that the 
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hopes of success can outweigh information suggesting that success cannot be attained. This is 
particularly relevant to the outdoor context, where fear is a fairly common emotion. Fear is 
accepted as something that an outdoor leader can acknowledge but is also taught to push through.  
 It is important that ‘acute’ symptoms of fear, such as heights, do not impede a leader’s 
performance. But if a leader is experiencing more ‘chronic’ fear, say from making observations 
suggesting an unstable snowpack throughout a morning climb, it is also important they do not 
just push it by the wayside to replace it with hope; balance is key (Drummond, 2014). 
 
Role of Heuristics 
 A crucial step to interrupting the process of overcommitment is the assessment and 
judgement of risk. One has to know that there is something wrong before they can make a 
judgement on whether to continue or to abort.  
 Ian McCammon (2002, 2003) has conducted a wealth of research that examines the role 
of heuristics in outdoor decision-making, specifically avalanche incidents. Heuristics are 
shortcuts in mental processing and are actually helpful most of the time. They allow an 
individual to make a decision, usually a routine or familiar one, without dedicating a large 
amount of mental processing power to it, allowing that individual to focus on other things. For 
example, you don’t have to think exceedingly hard about where you turn on your daily commute 
home from work and, instead, can think about what to make for dinner or what you need from 
the store. However, you can’t simply turn these shortcuts off, so that individual may find 
themselves taking a shortcut in a situation that actually requires more thought (Furman, et al., 
2010). Better understanding how to help outdoor leaders ‘turn off’ these heuristics can improve 
their decision-making ability. 
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Tying various heuristics together can accurately sum up almost all the factors of 
escalation of commitment, specifically in the outdoor context. A commonly used acronym to 
reference these heuristics is ‘FACETS,’ standing for familiarity, acceptance, commitment, expert 
halo, tracks, and social proof.  
1) Familiarity, as discussed by McCammon (2002, 2003) also has ties to Staw’s 
retrospective rationality (1981), where an actor will base their current decision 
heavily on what they have done in similar situations in the past.  
2) Acceptance, or wanting to make a decision that fits in with the norm and makes a 
group happy, undercuts almost all efforts to effectively make sound group decisions 
(Street & Anthony, 1997; Deutsch, 1989; Khoshsoroor, et al., 2019; Whyte, 1993). 
3) Commitment, or anchoring, gets at the root of overcommitment itself. (McCammon, 
2003) It’s much harder to deviate from a course of action if that action is seen as your 
only option other than abandon the objective altogether. Jed Williamson (2013), one 
of the cornerstone outdoor accident investigators, cites this as the number one reason 
for outdoor accidents. 
4) Expert Halo is the tendency to view the most experienced person as always right. 
Usually, the most experienced in an outdoor group will be the leader, the one making 
decisions, and there are ties back to the role of personal responsibility (Staw, 1981).  
5) Tracks, or scarcity, functions to put more weight on a successful outcome. 
(McCammon, 2002) ‘Getting first tracks’ means to be the first one to accomplish a 
certain objective or to reach a new personal record of some kind. This sort of pressure 
puts more emphasis on the outcome, increasing personal responsibility (Staw, 1981) 
and putting a ‘time crunch’ on accomplishing an objective now rather than later. 
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6) Social proof can encourage actors to continue with a potentially poor course of action 
if there is evidence that someone else has already done it. This relates to Staw’s 
prospective rationality (1981) such that obtaining evidence that someone else has 
already accomplished something increases the chance, in the decision-maker’s mind, 
that they will be able to as well.  
Specifically, in the outdoor context, there seems to be a great deal of overlap between 
escalation of commitment and heuristics. Many outdoors decisions may be subject to escalation 
of commitment and FACETS is specifically designed as a framework to help outdoors leaders 
with these decisions. Identifying exactly how effective this framework is and how it can be 
improved can provide direction for mitigating escalation of commitment. 
Research Question 
 This study examines the effectiveness of current heuristic education models and their 
effectiveness. Currently, models like FACETS are the standard. When learning about FACETS, 
students will memorize the acronym and what each letter stands for, then are required to ask 
themselves if they could be falling victim to any one of the six heuristics at each decision-
making point. Is this model of education and application really effective? To answer this 
question, analysis of responses to a situation from a treatment group, receiving information on 
heuristics congruent with current practices, and a control group, receiving no education on 
heuristics, was conducted.  
Hypotheses 
 If the current method of education and application of heuristic-conscious decision making 
is effective, then the treatment group should be more likely to demonstrate higher levels of 
caution in a situation where heuristics’ effects are present.  
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Hypothesis One. Heuristics tend to trick decision-makers into believing a situation they 
are encountering is simpler than it actually is. Those who are familiar with heuristics may be 
aware of this effect and choose to spend more time searching for more information. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that the treatment group will demonstrate a higher desire to search for more 
information than the control group will.  
Hypothesis Two. Heuristics can make a situation that presents a degree of hazard as 
seeming less risky than it actually is. Those who are familiar with heuristics may be aware of this 
effect and perceive more risk than is suggested. Therefore, I hypothesize that the treatment group 
will demonstrate a higher perception of risk than the control group.  
Hypothesis Three. As established, there is a high amount of overlap between the effects 
of heuristics and the escalation of commitment. Those who operate with heuristics in mind may 
be less likely to continue on a course of action that becomes unsafe. In this study, participants are 
asked whether they will move forward on a potentially dangerous path. I hypothesize the 
treatment group will demonstrate lower desire to continue on that unsafe course of action than 
the control group will. 
Methods and Instruction 
To test these hypotheses, a cross-sectional survey method with two conditions, one 
treatment group (Appendix B) and one control group (Appendix C), was used. Both surveys 
consisted of two parts. The first part had an educational intent. The treatment group received 
information on two heuristics, familiarity and social proof. This included what heuristics are, 
how to spot them, and how to mitigate their effects. The control group, on the other hand, 
received information on a technical aspect of avalanches (differences between point-release and 
slab avalanches). After reading this brief informational page, the participants then completed a 
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brief and basic check for understanding and engagement (two true/false questions) before 
proceeding onto section two. 
 The second section was the decision-making portion of the survey and was constant 
across both groups. First, participants read a description of a day spent ski mountaineering 
(climbing up a mountain then skiing down it), an activity that exposes the climber to avalanche 
terrain. Within this description, there were several red flags related to the heuristics on which the 
treatment group was educated. Based on these red flags, it would be clear to experienced outdoor 
leaders that this situation warranted some amount of hesitation.  
This was also the same type of activity on which the control group received information, 
however none of the technical knowledge they learned had any reason to affect their decision-
making process. Since the treatment group received information relevant to the situation given, it 
was also important to give the control group information that seemed relevant to the situation in 
order to rule out any possibility the treatment group performed better because they feel more 
confident answering, etc.  
After reading about the situation, the participants then answered several questions. These 
questions gauged their desire to gather more information, their perception of risk, their 
perception of the probability of an avalanche occurring, and finally their intent to maintain their 
current course of action. Finally, subjects proceeded to the second page of the second section 
where they answered demographic questions. 
Measures and Variables 
 The first measure worth noting is the check for understanding that occurred at the end of 
the education section. This consisted of two simple true/false questions about the information the 
participant just read. If the participant got these questions wrong, it was assumed that, for 
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whatever reason, they did not fully understand the information and responses were invalidated. 
Only five participants got these questions wrong, three control participants and two treatment 
participants, and their responses are not reported in the overall sample size. 
 In the decision-making section, four variables were measured: a) the amount of time a 
participant was willing to search for more information, b) the probability of an avalanche 
occurring, c) the level of risk of continuing the current path, and d) the probability of continuing 
on the current path. All of these variables were measured on a 0-10 scale, anchored at the 
extremes (i.e. 0 anchored as “Avalanche is impossible” and 10 anchored as “Avalanche is 
certain” for the avalanche probability variable).  
 Finally, demographics information was captured. This includes participants’ age, gender, 
experience in the outdoors, and knowledge of formal decision-making theory. Though there were 
no criteria for participation in this study related to outdoors or decision-making knowledge, this 
information was captured in order to rule out potential confounds if such trends arose. 
Participants and Sampling 
 There were no qualifications or limitation on participants in order to participate, other 
than ability to consent. Ages ranged from 18-22 to 51+ (mode = “18-22”) (Figure 1), gender was 
slightly skewed towards women (66% women), and decision-making and outdoor training 
ranged across the spectrum (Figures 2 and 3). 
 Initially, participants were sent either the control or treatment survey at random. After 
completing it, they would then pass on the survey they received to others. Ultimately, this 
resulted in 71 total participants, 34 in the treatment condition and 37 in the control condition.  
Results 
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 Overall, no support was found for any of the hypotheses. All hypotheses were tested at a 
95% confidence level using independent samples t-tests. 
Hypothesis One 
 An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the desire to search for more 
information between the treatment and control conditions. No significant difference was found 
between the treatment group (M = 4.65, SD = 2.17) and the control group (M = 4.57, SD = 2.78); 
t(69) = 0.14, p = .89. These results show no support for hypothesis one. 
Hypothesis Two 
 An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the perception of path riskiness 
between the treatment and control conditions. No significant difference was found between the 
treatment group (M = 5.71, SD = 2.21) and the control group (M = 5.30, SD = 1.94); t(69) = 0.83, 
p = .41. These results show no support for hypothesis two. 
Hypothesis Three 
 An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the probability of continuing on 
the current path between the treatment and control conditions. No significant difference was 
found between the treatment group (M = 5.50, SD = 2.19) and the control group (M = 5.68, SD = 
2.50); t(69) = 0.31, p = .75. These results show no support for hypothesis three. 
Discussion 
 Though no support for any hypotheses in a study is disappointing, no support in this 
study is cause for considerable alarm in the field of outdoor decision-making. The results suggest 
that a control group with no knowledge of heuristics can make decisions at the same level as a 
treatment group that has received just as much training in heuristics as the standard outdoor 
leader.  
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This study replicated ideal conditions, where the decision-maker is out of the elements 
and has no personal stake in the outcome, which would encourage a more cautious decision. In 
an actual applied situation, it may be much harder for an individual to make the decision to turn 
around if they had spent days or even weeks approaching an objective, only to find it was too 
dangerous to continue.  
The information on heuristics was fresh in treatment participants’ minds as well, and the 
red flags relating to those heuristics were fairly obvious in the situational description. In an 
actual applied situation, the decision-maker would have to actively remember to question the role 
of heuristics in any given moment and find a way to answer those questions objectively.  
These results in this study suggest that current methods of educating leaders on 
heuristics’ effects may not be effective and the current method of implementing that education 
may not actually be helpful.  
Limitations 
 As mentioned, this study was designed to be an ideal scenario, removing the participant 
from external factors that would push them towards making a decision to escalate rather then 
retreat. In doing so, it also cut out external factors that may have reversed that effect. For 
example, reading that you are standing at the top of a skiing route, unsure of the snow’s stability, 
carries much less weight than actually standing there, looking at how much snow could bury you 
or the cliffs you could be carried off.  
 In addition, the survey itself only measured the effects of two heuristics, familiarity and 
social proof. This was done in an effort to keep the survey as brief as possible. Though education 
and application of other heuristics is near identical, it’s possible that familiarity and social proof 
are somehow less salient than others. Therefore, the results may have been different if the 
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heuristics measured were more comprehensive and survey more inclusive and detailed. For 
example, the acceptance heuristic (essentially trying to make decisions that please others) can be 
incredibly powerful but is also something that’s difficult to capture in a survey. 
 Finally, as with any study, a larger sample size would’ve yielded a more complete answer 
to the research question. Though confounds, such as previous outdoor experience, were 
measured in the survey, the limited sample size meant these measures couldn’t carry any 
statistical significance.  
Future Direction 
 Given the lack of support for hypotheses and subsequent questioning of current education 
and application methods, the most prudent future direction would be to develop and to test 
enhanced methods related to heuristics and decision-making. Further incorporating previous 
research to lay out a more all-encompassing approach could be beneficial. 
 For example, Barry Staw’s model of retrospective rationality, modeling, and prospective 
rationality (1981) could provide the basis for a new framework. If one were to carefully define 
success and failure in their planning of an objective (modeling) along with more comprehensive 
debriefing and analysis of decisions made after the fact (to improve retrospective and prospective 
rationality the next time), then they’d have a system that not only limits the effect of heuristics 
leading to escalation of commitment on that trip, but they also have a system that can encourage 
continual learning and assessment of one’s own decision-making tendencies.  
 To bolster decision-making abilities in the moment, incorporating heuristics into planning 
documents could be a piece of the new model as well. If one thinks about which heuristics they 
are most likely to encounter at different points while pursuing an objective, then that can take the 
requirement that leaders remember to assess heuristics’ influence at every decision. For example, 
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if one is traveling through a well-known area to attempt a skiing objective they’ve never 
successfully done before, they can anticipate that familiarity will play a large role in the 
beginning of the trip, while scarcity may play a larger role once they actually reach that 
objective. 
 These are just some suggestions for future study that can simultaneously broaden the 
scope of any heuristics education while also potentially making said education easier to apply 
and more effective. Though it is easy to simply suggest these ideas, testing them will be required 
to ensure they are actually effective. When doing so, a study like this one may be an effective 
way to get a proof-of-concept in ideal conditions. However, real-world testing is certainly 
needed in order to fully validate a potentially new method. 
Conclusion 
 This study opened with a description of the events that occurred in May of 1996 on Mt. 
Everest, but it should be clear that escalation of commitment doesn’t always result in such a 
dramatic loss of life. Outdoor leaders make a multitude of decisions constantly in order to protect 
their team while accomplishing an objective, and much more often than not these are excellent 
decisions. However, it is troubling that one of the frameworks the field currently relies on has 
failed to show validity in this study. In an effort to better educate those leaders who are often 
faced with difficult decisions, research and development of ways to bolster that framework are 
needed.  
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Appendix A 
Treatment Survey
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Appendix B 
Control Survey
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Figure 1 
Bar chart of participants’ age. 
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Figure 2 
Bar chart of participants’ decision-making knowledge. 
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Figure 3 
Bar chart of participants’ outdoor experience level. 
 
